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 One way of thinking about the ways in which photography contributed to the 
experience of fine art, and perhaps to the structure of experience itself, is as the 
primary driver and a catalyst of modernist aesthetics. According to this view, 
photography is entangled in the visual strategies of modernism and the avant-guarde 
both as part of the mode of reproduction inherent in the development of industrial 
capitalism and as the key modality by which the contemporary myth of the artist came 
to be expressed. In other words, photography can be seen as the medium by which the 
art establishment came to assert its elite status while at the same time providing it with 
an aesthetic lens that fetishized the snapshot as the ultimate expression of the 
Duchampian notion of the ‘readymade’.  
By giving every member of society a recognisable and recordable face that could 
be preserved in a family album, stored in a police file and exhibited in a museum, 
photography acted as the catalyst for the creation of the modern individual as someone 
who spends their life as a passive spectator of flickering images while at the same time 
being exposed to universal procedures of recording and surveillance. The determining 
factor here is that both as a form of  mass entertainment and of social control, 
photography is marked by a rational and logical relationship among images and the 
world they allegedly represent. In what follows, I will suggest that when  the 
engagement with photography is limited to questions of recognition and resemblance, 
such approach stifles our experience of the world and directs us towards monotonous 
homogeneity in which everything can be represented in a photograph, and a 
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photograph is always a representation of something or other. And yet, a photograph 
has the potential to move our gaze beyond representation of events and situations in a 
way that allows us to penetrate the appearance of things and to sense their inner truth, 
rather than act as a mere illustration. 
As two brief examples, we might think of the photograph in a passport that is 
used to verify the identity of its owner when the border control (human or facial 
recognition algorithm)  compares the resemblance between the image and the person, 
and then, in a different (but connected) manner, the video recording made by Diamond 
Reynolds of the aftermath of her boyfriend, Philando Castile being shot by police 
officers, which was viewed by millions of people online, and acted as a catalyst to the 
‘Black lives matter’ movement. In the first case, the passport photo speaks not only 
about the similarity between the image and the person, but also about a system of 
power and control that attributes a legal status to visual resemblance, and legitimises 
the passing of judgement that is based on visual appearance alone. In the second 
example, the cameraphone recording transcends the logic of recognition, in which we 
see a black man bleeding out next to his girlfriend after being shot by police, and 
conclude that this must be a terrible situation to find oneself in. What is presented to 
the viewer through the images and the voices that the camera captured, is not only a 
documentation of an event, but also the perception of a reality that is bigger and more 
complex that any representation. Rather than being a faithful documentation of 
something that happened, this footage acquires a certain autonomy from the event it 
recorded, releasing from it a force that is haunting and scarring the viewer. While we 
can never feel what it was like to be in that car during that shooting, the jittery 
recording of the car window that frames the policeman on an ubiquitous sidewalk 
shouting hysterically, combined with the calm, repetitious narration by Diamond 
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Reynolds who is talking both to the officer and to us, simultaneously responding to 
orders to show her hands and reporting her boyfriend’s death and her own arrest, 
suggest that violence, racism and fear are both everyday occurrences in suburban 
America and that they have a specific visual form that this video recording managed to 
capture.  
 
 
In both cases discussed above the image acts not only as a rational representation 
of an external reality, and its authority and agency are anchored not only in our naive 
belief in photography’s ability to simply record a world of people, objects and events 
just as it is. Rather, what we are able to glimpse is the autonomy of the photographic 
image (both moving and still), and its ability to expose the power of the image qua 
image to shape and intervene in the world around us. What we are witnessing is not a 
representation of pre-existing reality, but the photograph allows us to intuit that the 
visual image is endowed with unique power, and that the power of photography lies 
not in its ability to represent, but in asserting the materiality of visual perception.  
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How might we begin to think about the materiality of photography in a way that 
frees it from a dependence on representation? Consider for instance the slideshow 
REM (2016) by Kenta Cobayashi (with God Scorpion and Molphobia): the sequence is 
dominated by a continuous movement through an imaginary landscape constructed 
from parts of photographs, liquefied billboards and morphed walls, surrounded by 
reflective, water-like surface. Floating through this world one might think of gliding 
the canals of Venice, or of Ridley Scott’s panning shoots of the post-apocalyptic New 
York in Blade Runner (1982). And yet, in REM every solid composite that first 
appears to the eye as a billboard or a wall of a building is revealed to be nothing more 
(or less) than a surface: the camera pierces each surface in turn, revealing another 
surface behind it, that – like the previous one – appears solid at first, but has no other 
substance than the data it is made of. What this work allows us to experience is that 
beyond the compositional elements of an image lies its material condition of 
continuous repetition, copy and self-replication. Jean-Francois Lyotard named this 
condition ‘The Great Ephemeral Skin’. In Libidinal Economy he proposed that the role 
of the artist is to lay bare the mechanisms of representation, to show that if there is 
anything real about representation, it is because there also exists a fully real virtual 
domain constructed not from objects and things, but from intensities, desires and 
surfaces: 
The representative chamber is an energetic dispositif. To describe it 
and to follow its functioning, that’s what needs to be done. No need 
to do a critique of metaphysics (or of political economy, which is 
the same thing), since critique presupposes and ceaselessly creates 
this very theatricality; rather be inside and forget it, that’s the 
position of the death drive, describe these foldings and gluings, 
these energetic vections that establish the theatrical cube with its six 
homogenous faces on the unique and heterogeneous surface.  
(Lyotard 2004, p. 3) 
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In REM photography is being revealed not as a ‘representative chamber’, but as 
an infinite movement of surfaces that continuously self-replicate and morph into each 
other. The laws of matter in a three dimensional world do not apply to the great 
ephemeral screen on which images proliferate, as on this screen the logic of Euclidian 
geometry is replaced by the evolving symmetry of fractal geometry. This is not 
because photography here is rejecting a reference to reality, but because reality itself is 
understood as photographic and for that reason indefinitely signified, continuously 
recurring, subject to the logic of technology, mass-production and the perpetual 
reformulation of commodities for new markets.  
 In its traditional form photography expresses the potential for representation 
located within capitalist organization of society. But when photography is detached 
from its ability to produce representations and considered as a flow of image-data, one 
arrives at another fully real force that springs from photography’s ability to produce 
rhythms and not forms, reproduce and not represent, proliferate and not identify, self-
replicate and not copy. As a process of instantaneous distribution, photography is being 
 6 
detached from objects in space as it poses a question about the condition of seeing as 
such. Instead of evaluating images on the basis of their similarity to actual events or 
situations, instead of re-examining their indexical or symbolic content, what is required 
is to inquire after the conditions that make something like an image possible. By 
exploring the rules of engagement that govern the use of images, it might be possible 
to free thought from its dependence on the Platonic opposites of image (eikon) and 
Reality (eidos) (The Republic, 601 b-c), and from the binary dualisms that follow from 
it. For as long as the rule of this binary model persists, it is impossible to escape what 
Deleuze branded as ‘the four iron collars of representation: Identity in the concept, 
opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgment and resemblance in perception.’   
(Deleuze 2004, p. 330)  
 
Daisuke Yokota, Interception 2009 
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The work of Daisuke Yokota can be considered in this light, as an attempt to 
draw attention away from representation, to the process that can make a picture 
possible. By working with aspects of image production, Yokota approaches the visual 
via a series of transformations that tend to obscure, obliterate and deface the optical 
surface while simultaneously creating an image that exposes the strategies of image 
making. Yokota’s works could be read as a critique of traditional photography’s anti-
photographic tendencies: by privileging sharpness, clarity and realism photography 
modelled itself on how the human subject wants to see the world, rather then insisting 
on a view of the world that is inherently photographic. The camera lens is not the same 
as a human eye, and the chemical or algorithmic processing is not the same as the 
processing of visual stimuli by human brain. Because the camera is not a human 
prosthetic limb, it can create images that are divorced from the way the world presents 
itself to a human subjectivity. Crucially, photography can show us the world not as it 
appears to a spectator, but as a collection of perceptions of intensity, before they are 
submitted to the logic of representation. To say the same thing slightly differently, it is 
not me who is making images of the world, rather by encountering the world as an 
image, I become who I am. In the famous opening paragraphs of Matter and Memory, 
Henri Bergson explains:  
Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the 
word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, 
unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react 
upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant 
laws which I call laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of 
these laws would probably allow us to calculate and to foresee what 
will happen in each of these images, the future of the images must 
be contained in their present and will add to them nothing new. Yet 
there is one of them which is distinct from all the others, in that I do 
not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by 
affections: it is my body.  (Bergson 2005, p. 17) 
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Externally I might see a tree, a dog or a house, but internally all I can sense is 
images and I experience my own body as an image. Photography then is not an 
accidental invention or a random discovery of the technological age, but rather it is 
rooted in the very process that is making human beings out of animals and political 
subjects out of humans. The photograph is giving us an image of the world that is not 
human because it is not constrained to the subjective processes of representation. 
Instead, the photograph interrupts the relationship between us and the world, producing 
familiarity and repetition on the one hand and openness towards new, previously 
unknown forms of experience on the other.  
All this means that photography is not a tool that is making us look further, 
remember better and record everything for posterity, rather, it is a way of experiencing 
reality as layered amalgam of data connected through processes of repetition, self-
replication and copy. The power of photography, its enduring fascination and mystery 
is that is allows us to see the world not reduced to the view of the human eye.  
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